Finally! A Compact Lattice-Based Threshold Signature

Guilhem Niot, joint work with Rafael del Pino

Journées C2 2025 - 03/04/2025

SHIELD



1. Background

Threshold cryptography

Start with two observations...

Devices can be **compromised** or **made out of order**.



Solution: share secret

Threshold Cryptography: *T*-out-of-*N* scheme

- T out of N parties can perform an operation
- Less than *T* cannot





Solution: replicate secret

NIST Call for Threshold Schemes

PUBLICATIONS

NIST IR 8214C (2nd Public Draft) **NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes**



Date Published: March 27, 2025 Comments Due: April 30, 2025 **Email Comments to:** <u>nistir-8214C-comments@nist.gov</u>

Author(s)

Luís T. A. N. Brandão (NIST, Strativia), Rene Peralta (NIST)

Announcement


This is a second public draft. Threshold schemes should NOT be submitted until the final version of this report is published. However, the present draft can be used as a baseline to prepare for future submissions.

The scope of the call is organized into categories related to signing (Sign), public-key encryption (PKE), symmetric-key cryptography and hashing (Symm), key generation (KeyGen), fully homomorphic encryption

4

(T-out-of-N) threshold signatures What are they?

An interactive protocol to distribute signature generation.




- Global verification key vk
- I partial signing key sk_i per party
- T-out-of-N:
 - Correctness: Any T out of N parties can collaborate to sign a message under vk.
 - **Unforgeability:** T 1 corrupted parties cannot sign.



(*T*-out-of-*N*) threshold signatures What are they?

An interactive protocol to distribute signature generation.



Signature σ on msg

Pre-quantum solutions

- Mature solutions:
 - EdDSA: FROST [KG20]
 - ECDSA: [ANOS+21]
 - BLS: [Bol03]
 - RSA: [Sho00]
- Provide all desirable properties.

Lattice-based Threshold Signatures

An active field of research.

Threshold Raccoon: Practical Threshold Signatures from Standard Lattice Assumptions

Rafael del Pino¹, Shuichi Katsumata^{1,2}, Mary Maller^{1,3}, Fabrice Mouhartem⁴, Thomas Prest¹, Markku-Juhani Saarinen^{1,5}

Two-Round Threshold Signature from Algebraic One-More Learning with Errors

Thomas Espitau¹, Shuichi Katsumata^{1,2}, Kaoru Takemure^{* 1,2}

Ringtail: Practical Two-Round Threshold Signatures from Learning with Errors

Cecilia Boschini ETH Zürich, Switzerland Darya Kaviani UC Berkeley, USA Russell W. F. Lai Aalto University, Finland

Giulio Malavolta Bocconi University, Italy

Akira Takahashi JPMorgan AI Research & AlgoCRYPT CoE, USA

Mehdi Tibouchi NTT Social Informatics Laboratories, Japan

Flood and Submerse: Distributed Key Generation and Robust Threshold Signature from Lattices

Thomas Espitau¹ , Guilhem Niot^{1,2} , and Thomas Prest¹ \bigcirc

Two-round *n*-out-of-n and Multi-Signatures and Trapdoor Commitment from Lattices^{*}

Ivan Damgård¹, Claudio Orlandi¹, Akira Takahashi¹, and Mehdi Tibouchi²

MuSig-L: Lattice-Based Multi-Signature With Single-Round Online Phase*

Cecilia Boschini¹, Akira Takahashi², and Mehdi Tibouchi³

Two-Round Threshold Lattice-Based Signatures from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption*

Kamil Doruk Gur¹ , Jonathan Katz^{2**} , and Tjerand Silde^{3***}





Threshold Raccoon, a practical threshold signature

Threshold Raccoon: Practical Threshold Signatures from Standard Lattice Assumptions


Rafael del Pino¹, Shuichi Katsumata^{1,2}, Mary Maller^{1,3}, Fabrice Mouhartem⁴, Thomas Prest¹, Markku-Juhani Saarinen^{1,5}

Speed	Rounds	max N	 vk 	sig	Total communication
Fast	3	1024	4 kB	13 kB	40 kB



Designing a threshold scheme

Design choices ? Underlying scheme



Lattice-based Threshold Signatures Candidate schemes

Easier to thresholdize


	Fiat-Shamir	Hash & Sign	
	G+G [DPS23]	Eagle [YJW23]	Gaussian Sampling
More compa	Dilithium [LDK+22]	Phoenix [JRS24]	Rejection Sampling
	Raccoon [dEK+24]	Plover [EEN+24]	Noise Flooding



Lattice-based Threshold Signatures **Candidate schemes**

Easier to thresholdize

Gaussian Sampling	Eagle
Rejection Sampling	Phoer
Noise Flooding	Plove



This talk: Dilithium threshold variant.



Lattice-based Threshold Signatures

An active field of research, with different designs.

Thresholdization technique	Size	Speed	Rounds	Comm/party
MPC	S	Slow	15	$\geq 1 MB$
FHE	М	As fast as FHE	2	$\geq 1 MB$
Tailored	S-M	Fast	2-4	$20 \text{ kB} \rightarrow 56T \text{ kB}$

Lattice-based Threshold Signatures

An active field of research, with different designs.

Thresholdization technique	Size	Speed	Rounds	Comm/party
MPC	S	Slow	15	$\geq 1 MB$
FHE	М	As fast as FHE	2	$\geq 1 MB$
Tailored	S-M	Fast	2-4	$20 \text{ kB} \rightarrow 56T \text{ kB}$

This talk: Tailored

Ivan Damgård¹, Claudio Orlandi¹, Akira Takahashi¹, and Mehdi Tibouchi²

 \rightarrow more compact and *T*-out-of-*N*?

Two-round n-out-of-n and Multi-Si Dilithium-like **Trapdoor Commitment from Lattices***

2. Compact Dilithium-like Threshold Signatures

Finally! A Compact Lattice-Based Threshold Signature

Rafael del Pino¹
 0 and Guilhem Niot^{1,2}
 0

Fiat-Shamir with Aborts signature

$\mathsf{Rej}(\mathbf{v},\chi_r,\chi_z,M)\to \mathbf{z}\mid \bot$

•
$$\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$$

•
$$\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r}$$

•
$$b \leftarrow \mathscr{B}\left(\max\left(\frac{\chi_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z})}{M\chi_{\mathbf{r}}(\mathbf{r})}, 1\right)\right)$$

• If
$$b = 0$$
 then $\mathbf{z} = \bot$

For proper parameters, $\text{Rej}(\mathbf{v}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M) \sim \text{Ideal}(\chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M)$.

 \rightarrow distribution of z is independent of the secret value v

$\mathsf{Ideal}(\chi_z, M) \to \mathbf{z} \mid \bot$

•
$$\mathbf{Z} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{Z}}$$

•
$$b \leftarrow \mathscr{B}\left(\frac{1}{M}\right)$$

• If
$$b = 0$$
 then $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{1}$

Fiat-Shamir with Aborts signature

$$\begin{aligned} & \operatorname{Rej}(\mathbf{v}, \chi_r, \chi_z, M; \mathbf{r}) \to \mathbf{z} \mid \bot \\ & \bullet \quad \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{r} \\ & \bullet \quad b \leftarrow \mathscr{B}\left(\max\left(\frac{\chi_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z})}{M\chi_{\mathbf{r}}(\mathbf{r})}, 1\right) \right) \\ & \bullet \quad \operatorname{If} b = 0 \text{ then } \mathbf{z} = \bot \\ & \bullet \quad \operatorname{Return} \mathbf{z} \end{aligned}$$

In the ROM, the distribution of signatures of the above scheme is independent of the secret sk.

 \rightarrow allows to prove unforgeability

$FSwA.Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $z = \bot$ then restart
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})

FSwA.Verify(vk, msg, sig = (c, z))

- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{z} c \cdot \mathbf{v}\mathbf{k}$
- Assert $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Assert z short

$\mathsf{FSwA}.\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{msg})\to\mathsf{sig}$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $z = \bot$ then **restart**
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})



TH-FSwA . Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig

Round 1:

- Sample a short \mathbf{r}_i
- $\mathbf{w}_i = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$
- Broadcast $cmt_i = H_{cmt}(\mathbf{w}_i)$

Round 2:

• Broadcast \mathbf{W}_i

Round 3:

- $\mathbf{w} = \sum_i \mathbf{w}_i$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Broadcast $\mathbf{z}_i = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}_i, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r}_i)$

$$(c, \sum_{i \in S} \mathbf{z}_i)$$



$FSwA.Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $\mathbf{z} = \bot$ then **restart**
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})
- \mathbf{W}_i is revealed even in case of rejection
 - Need proof strategy to show independence from
 - [DOTT22] hides rejected \mathbf{W}_i with a trapdoor commitment scheme
 - [BTT22] simulates rejected \mathbf{W}_i but with regularity lemma (degraded parameters)

S	secret

Intuition N-out-of-N setting: $sk = \sum sk_i$

TH-FSwA . Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig

Round 1:

- Sample a short \mathbf{r}_i
- $\mathbf{w}_i = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$
- Broadcast $cmt_i = H_{cmt}(\mathbf{w}_i)$

Round 2:

• Broadcast \mathbf{W}_i

Round 3:

- $\mathbf{w} = \sum_{i} \mathbf{w}_{i}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Broadcast $\mathbf{z}_i = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}_i, \chi_r, \chi_z, M; \mathbf{r}_i)$

$$(c, \sum_{i \in S} \mathbf{z}_i)$$



$FSwA.Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $z = \bot$ then **restart**
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})
- \mathbf{W}_i is revealed even in case of rejection
 - Need proof strategy to show independence from
 - [DOTT22] hides rejected \mathbf{W}_i with a trapdoor commitment scheme
 - [BTT22] simulates rejected \mathbf{W}_i but with regularity lemma (degraded parameters)
 - \rightarrow Tighter simulation lemma

S	secret

Intuition N-out-of-N setting: $sk = \sum sk_i$

TH-FSwA . Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig

Round 1:

- Sample a short \mathbf{r}_i
- $\mathbf{w}_i = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$
- Broadcast $cmt_i = H_{cmt}(\mathbf{w}_i)$

Round 2:

• Broadcast \mathbf{W}_i

Round 3:

- $\mathbf{w} = \sum_{i} \mathbf{w}_{i}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Broadcast $\mathbf{z}_i = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}_i, \chi_r, \chi_z, M; \mathbf{r}_i)$

$$(c, \sum_{i \in S} \mathbf{z}_i)$$



Lemma: Rejected \mathbf{w}_i is indis $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$ is indisting $\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{z}$ is indistinguisha

- **Lemma:** Rejected \mathbf{w}_i is indistinguishable from uniform if:
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$ is indistinguishable from uniform, with $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $[A \ I] \cdot z$ is indistinguishable from uniform, with $z \leftarrow \chi_z$

$FSwA.Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $z = \bot$ then **restart**
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})
- $\circ \mathbf{W}_i$ is revealed even in case of rejection
 - Need proof strategy to show independence from secret
 - [DOTT22] hides rejected \mathbf{W}_i with a trapdoor commitment scheme
 - [BTT22] simulates rejected \mathbf{W}_i but with regularity lemma (degraded parameters)

 \rightarrow Tighter simulation lemma

• How to support T-out-of-N?

TH-FSwA . Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig

Round 1:

- Sample a short \mathbf{r}_i
- $\mathbf{W}_i = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$
- Broadcast $cmt_i = H_{cmt}(\mathbf{w}_i)$

Round 2:

• Broadcast \mathbf{W}_i

Round 3:


•
$$\mathbf{w} = \sum_i \mathbf{w}_i$$

- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Broadcast $\mathbf{z}_i = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}_i, \chi_r, \chi_z, M; \mathbf{r}_i)$

$$(c, \sum_{i \in S} \mathbf{z}_i)$$




Short secret sharing



- o Individual pool of short shares $\mathbf{sk}_i = (\mathbf{s}_i^{(1)}, \mathbf{s}_i^{(2)}, \dots)$
- T shares: can recover sk
 - Reconstruction vector $L_{S,i}$ with small coefficients
- $\leq T 1$ shares: can't recover sk

Short secret sharing



- o Individual pool of short shares $\mathbf{sk}_i = (\mathbf{s}_i^{(1)}, \mathbf{s}_i^{(2)}, \dots)$
- T shares: can recover sk
 - Reconstruction vector $L_{S,i}$ with small coefficients
- $\leq T 1$ shares: can't recover sk

Example: *N*-out-of-*N* sharing (one share per party)

- $\mathsf{sk}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{sk}_N \leftarrow \mathscr{D}^N_\sigma$ and $\mathsf{sk} = \sum_i \mathsf{sk}_i$
- $L_{S,i} = 1$

Extends to T-out-of-N by having several shares per party.



$FSwA.Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig$

- $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \chi_{\mathbf{r}}$
- $\mathbf{w} = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}$
- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- $\mathbf{z} = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \operatorname{sk}, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r})$
- If $z = \bot$ then **restart**
- Return (c, \mathbf{Z})
- \mathbf{W}_i is revealed even in case of rejection
 - Need proof strategy to show independence of secret
 - [DOTT22] hides rejected \mathbf{W}_i with a trapdoor commitment scheme
 - [BTT22] simulates rejected \mathbf{W}_i but with regularity lemma (degraded parameters)

 \rightarrow Tighter simulation lemma

• How to support T-out-of-N? \rightarrow Use short secret sharing

TH-FSwA . Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow sig

Round 1:

- Sample a short \mathbf{r}_i
- $\mathbf{w}_i = [\mathbf{A} \ \mathbf{I}] \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$
- Broadcast $cmt_i = H_{cmt}(\mathbf{w}_i)$

Round 2:

• Broadcast \mathbf{W}_i

Round 3:

•
$$\mathbf{w} = \sum_i \mathbf{w}_i$$

- $c = H(\mathbf{w}, \mathsf{msg})$
- Broadcast $\mathbf{z}_i = \operatorname{Rej}(c \cdot \langle L_{S,i}, \operatorname{sk}_i \rangle, \chi_{\mathbf{r}}, \chi_{\mathbf{z}}, M; \mathbf{r}_i)$

$$(c, \sum_{i \in S} \mathbf{z}_i)$$




3. T-out-of-N short secret sharing

How to Shortly Share a Short Vector DKG with Short Shares and Application to Lattice-Based Threshold Signatures with Identifiable Aborts

Rafael del Pino¹ ⁽⁶⁾, Thomas Espitau¹ ⁽⁶⁾, Guilhem Niot^{1,2} ⁽⁶⁾, and Thomas \mathbf{Prest}^1 $\mathbf{0}$

Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T-1 parties, sample a uniform share $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$.






Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T-1 parties, sample a uniform share $S_{\mathcal{T}}$.

 ${f S}_{\{1\}}$






Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.


1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T - 1 parties, sample a uniform share $\mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.

 $s_{\{1\}} s_{\{2\}}$




Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

- 1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T 1 parties, sample a uniform share $\mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.
- 2. Distribute $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ to the parties in $[N] \setminus \mathcal{T}$.



Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

- 1. For any set \mathscr{T} of T 1 parties, sample a uniform share $\mathbf{s}_{\mathscr{T}}$.
- 2. Distribute $\mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$ to the parties in $[N] \setminus \mathcal{T}$.
- 3. Define $\mathbf{sk} = \sum_{\mathcal{T}} \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.



Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

- 1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T-1 parties, sample a uniform share $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$.
- 2. Distribute $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ to the parties in $[N] \setminus \mathcal{T}.$
- 3. Define $\mathbf{sk} = \sum_{\mathcal{T}} \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.

Properties:

- Reconstruction coefficients 0 or 1
- ^o When < T corrupted parties, at least one $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ remains hidden.
 - \rightarrow guarantees that sk remains protected



Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

- 1. For any set \mathcal{T} of T-1 parties, sample a short share $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$.
- 2. Distribute $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ to the parties in $[N] \setminus \mathcal{T}.$
- 3. Define $\mathbf{sk} = \sum_{\mathcal{T}} \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.

Properties:

- Reconstruction coefficients 0 or 1
- ^o When < T corrupted parties, at least one $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ remains hidden.

 \rightarrow guarantees that $[A \ I] \cdot sk$ looks uniform (MLWE assumption)

Idea: sample a share for any possible set of corrupted parties.

1. For any set \mathcal{T} sample a short

- 2. Distribute $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ to $[N] \setminus \mathcal{T}.$
- 3. Define $\mathbf{sk} = \sum_{\mathcal{T}} \mathbf{s}_{\mathcal{T}}$.

Caveat: This scheme has a number of shares that is equal to $\begin{pmatrix} N \\ T-1 \end{pmatrix}$. efficients 0 or 1

ted parties, at least

one $\mathbf{S}_{\mathcal{T}}$ remains hidden.

 \rightarrow guarantees that $[A \ I] \cdot sk$ looks uniform (MLWE assumption)

For $N \leq 8$,

Distributions	Speed	Rounds	 vk 	sig	Total communication
Gaussians	Fast	3	2.6 kB	2.7 kB	5.6 kB
Uniforms			3.1 kB	4.8 kB	13.5 kB

Comparable to Dilithium size: 2.4kB at NIST level II!

Conclusion

Conclusion

Introduced Finally, a 3-round compact lattice-based threshold signature

- Up to 8 parties
- Signature size 2.7kB (comparable to Dilithium, 2.4kB)

Future work?

- Techniques applied to thresholdize ML-DSA: up to 5 parties
- 2-round?
- Tackle malicious behaviour?

Questions?



